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Review Ar tide 
Michael Saward: Deliberation, Difference and Democratic 
Institutions 
Seyla Benhabib (ed.): Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of 
the Political, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996, 373 pp., 
hardback 535.00, paperback $16.95. 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson: Democracy and Disagreement, 
Cambridge, Mass. and London, The Belknap Press, 1996, 422pp., 
hardback S18.50. 
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen: Democratic Governance, New York, Free 
Press, 1995, 292 pp., hardback 520.00. 
Although the tone and style of each of these books differs markedly, the 
core concerns that unite them can be blended into a composite question: 
where has democracy come from, how much can we learn from its history, 
and to what extent should these lessons qualify where we think it might, 
and should, be going? 
Not least because ‘identity’ is important in these books, the ‘we’ in the 
question is worth a comment. These are all American texts, though four 
of the nineteen contributors to the Benhabib volume are not US authors. 
March’s and Olsen’s text makes practically no reference to any country, 
though it is implicitly about the USA primarily. Gutmann and Thompson 
more explicitly take the USA as their referent. The major themes of the 
Benhabib volume engage core US debates around democracy, identity, 
difference and the limits of universalist, individualistic liberalism (though 
there are exceptions, notably Will Kymlicka’s useful account of multi- 
cultural citizenship in Canada). In itself, the rootedness of these volumes 
is no bad thing, and hardly unusual. But the themes covered, and prescrip- 
tions for democracy offered, often carry an air of universal applicability 
that, ironically enough, is helped along by a modest dose of national 
myopia. 
There is a great deal that is innovative and provocative in each volume; 
we would expect no less, given the track record of all of the authors 
involved (the list of contributors to the Benhabib volume is close to being 
a roll-call of the great and good in current Anglo-American democratic 
theory). Each builds upon - and pushes back the boundaries of - 
distinctive traditions of writing about democracy. March and Olsen draw 
on old and new traditions of exploring democratic institutions - and 
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indeed they can claim to be the originators of the most recent branch of 
‘institutionalism’. Gutmann and Thompson build upon Rawlsian 
and post-Rawlsian debates in political philosophy, showing how key 
themes and principles in that field might creatively be reconciled with 
democratic thought and practice. Many of Benhabib’s contributors 
operate at the more abstract, idealistic and radical end of democratic 
theory, restless with the deficiencies and compromises of actually existing 
liberal democracy, the heirs in many ways of the 1960s and 1970s 
‘participationist’ school of democratic theory.’ 
THE PULL OF AN ‘OUGHT’ AND THE RESISTANCE OF AN ‘IS’ 
Comparing and contrasting selected key features of each text can be a 
fruitful exercise. As Giovanni Sartori has put it, democracy is about ‘the 
pull of an ought and the resistance of an is’;* the most interesting and 
politically important concerns about democracy’s present and future 
emerge, for example, in the contrast between March’s and Olsen’s more 
cautious ‘is’ and some of the outer-edge, idealistic ‘oughts’ of authors like 
Iris Marion Young in the Benhabib volume. Accordingly, after a brief 
run-through of each book, I shall pick up contrasting approaches to 
common themes of democratic deliberation, difference and institutional 
innovation. 
March and Olsen are motivated to answer two questions: ‘What sorts 
of citizens and institutions does it take to constitute a democratic society? 
How can such institutions and citizens be fostered?’ (p. 47). They reject 
the claim to primacy of ‘exchange’ approaches to the study of politics, 
which focus primarily on individual purposes, intentions, and rational 
choices made by actors with pre-given preferences. Instead, they continue 
the work of their earlier Rediscovering Institutions’ by stressing the ways in 
which practices and rules (both formal and informal) evolve in democratic 
systems and act as constraints on the attitudes that groups and individuals 
adopt, and on the choices they make. Their approach combines descrip- 
tion and prescription; in describing what we may have learnt about institu- 
tions in democratic governance, they glean insights into what governing 
institutions can do to promote a balanced combination of stability and 
inventiveness for the future. 
See for example C. B. Macpherson, The L@ and Times of Libeml D e m o m y ,  Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1977; C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970. 
G. Sartori, Thc Theory OfDemomo~y Revisited, Chatham, NJ, Chatham House, 1987, 
p. 8. 
J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, Rediscoveringlnstitzfio~, New York, Free Press, 1989. 
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One gets a sense from March and Olsen that, for modern democratic 
institutions in general, there is a fine balance to be struck between the 
necessarily autonomous functions of government and the fostering of 
citizen outlooks that lead to effective accountability of government. This 
sounds like common sense; indeed, their coverage of an enormous range 
of themes linking institutional continuity and change is more original in 
the parts than in the whole. March and Olsen acknowledge as much at the 
outset: ‘The ideas [in the book] are not particularly novel. They are even, 
perhaps, self-evident’ (p. 3). 
Using their key categories, political identities must combine rooted 
authenticity and ‘difference’ with common conceptions of community 
good and a disposition to pursue it; part of ‘the craft of democratic 
governance’, they argue, is developing institutions which ‘are capable of 
maintaining trust and mutual affection within a polity while simultane- 
ously accommodating enduringly inconsistent sub-group demands based 
on family ties, religion, ethnicity, language, or personal affinity’ (p. 55). 
(I return to this theme below.) Balance must be achieved between foster- 
ing political capabilities required for effective government and the need for 
democratic political control of leaders and experts. Similarly, when it 
comes to political accounts, the balance needs to be struck between the 
need for action and the need for justifications for action; accordingly, 
democracy depends on ‘structural arrangements that make accountability 
primarily periodic and posterior, rather than continuous and prior’ 
(p. 151). On political adaptiveness, the striking fact of the similarity of 
configurations of democratic institutions from one country to another 
(p. 224) ought not to crowd out institutional experimentation. Indeed, a 
useful interplay between a view of the gradual, punctuated evolution of 
complex institutional configurations, on the one hand, and the need for 
creative thinking about new democratic forms that might foster new 
important identities, capabilities, and accounts, on the other, runs 
through the book. 
Democratic Governance can be a dizzying, disorientating read despite its 
admirable clarity, clear-headedness, and commonsensical character. Its 
wide coverage of major issues means that problems such as developing 
capabilities for supranational politics, and possible future restructuring 
of the franchise, are dealt with rapidly. There is something for everyone; 
above all, anyone with concerns about democratic design and the practical 
and normative constraints that attend it will find much to chew over. 
The subtitle of Gutmann’s and Thompson’s Democracy and Disagreement 
is ‘Why moral conflict cannot be avoided in politics, and what should be 
done about it’. The sources of moral conflict - self-interest, scarcity, 
incompatible values and ignorance - will not go away. American demo- 
cracy and its attendant theoretical models and assumptions fall well short 
522 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 
of the ideal in their capacity and willingness to deal with moral conflict - 
examples of which in the book include preferential hiring, ‘workfare’ 
versus welfare, abortion, and surrogate parenthood. Particular targets are 
two conceptions of democracy, ‘procedural’ and ‘constitutional’, which 
(according to these authors) confine moral argument to the realm of 
private conscience and opinion and to rarefied judicial interpretation far 
distant from ordinary politics respectively. 
‘DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY’ 
Gutmann’s and Thompson’s preferred conception of democracy is 
‘deliberative democracy’. Their long, immaculately written and sophisti- 
cated book is the most extensive effort yet to specify and defend a delib- 
erative conception of democracy, the most influential strand in American 
democratic thinking for at least ten years (see discussion below). The ‘core 
idea’ of this conception, they argue, is that ‘when citizens or their 
representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together 
to reach mutually acceptable decisions’ (p. 1). 
The heart of the book consists of elaborate, illustrated elucidation of 
the six principles that should attend deliberation, at least in an ideal 
configuration. On their view, deliberative democracy ‘consists of three 
principles - reciprocity, publicity, and accountability - that regulate the 
process of politics, and three others - basic liberty, basic opportunity, and 
fair opportunity - that govern the content of policies’ (p. 12). Arguably, 
reciprocity is the key, in terms of deliberative procedures at least; this 
principle ‘tells citizens to appeal to reasons that are recognisably moral 
in form and mutually acceptable in content’ (p. 57). Even where moral 
disagreement survives fulsome, proper deliberation on a contentious 
moral issue, like abortion, the resulting disagreement might at least be 
characterized as ‘deliberative disagreement’, where agreeing to disagree 
can accompany mutual respect through recognition of the integrity and 
sincerity of one’s opponents and the reasonableness of the principles 
upon which their views are based. 
Attentive readers of Gutmann’s and Thompson’s book will be found 
among specialized audiences in applied political philosophy in the fields 
of health care, welfare and income, surrogate parenting and preferential 
hiring. Each is subjected to a virtuoso exploration in the light of the 
principles that ought to govern the outcome of democratic deliberation 
- liberty and the variants of opportunity. In the case of welfare, income 
and ‘workfare’, the authors even get down to the level of specific policy 
prescription (p. 294). 
But of course the book is meant to be more than this - and there’s the 
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rub. A basic tension between the need for actual citizen and government 
deliberation to resolve issues - ‘. . . a deliberative perspective expresses 
as complete a conception of a common good as is possible within a 
morally pluralistic society’ (p. 93) - and the authors’ proclivity for 
showing, quite precisely, how certain contentious moral issues ought to be 
resolved, runs through the book. The tension arises from the difficult 
relationship between the essentially procedural principles - reciprocity, 
etc. - and substantive principles such as basic liberty. Gutmann and 
Thompson do not want to leave too much to chance. They want extensive 
deliberation, but they do not want moral issues left only to the mercy 
of deliberation. They want to keep a tight rein on what might, indep- 
endently, count as an acceptable, principled outcome. Rightly enough, 
they stress at various points the mutual implication of procedural and 
substantive principles. Both ‘content’ and ‘condition’ principles can be 
interpreted and challenged in the process of deliberation itself (p. 201). 
Nevertheless, there emerges a real sense of the authors wanting to have 
their cake and eat it. Although there are no single right answers in a 
pluralistic world, and therefore deliberation through principled pro- 
cedures should be the highest aim of democrats (and the bestjustification 
for resulting policies being accepted), they appear all too ready to say what 
the right answers are with respect to some pressing American moral 
disputes. 
This criticism is not meant to be damning. It is all too understandable 
for those who wish to steer a path between early Rawlsian certainties about 
right principles (and possibly outcomes) and democratic theory traditions 
that are strongly procedural in focus. Again putting it too simply, the 
problems with Cutmann’s and Thompson’s effort illustrate the pitfalls 
accompanying what otherwise appears a highly desirable development - 
reconciling and combining the strengths of separately influential 
American discourses of the past quarter century on ‘democracy’ and 
‘social justice’ respectively. 
Elaborating the ‘deliberative model of democracy’ is arguably the core 
theme of Democracy and LXjJkrence too, though there is much more besides. 
In a volume displaying a healthy degree of mutual argument between 
chapters, coping theoretically and institutionally with ‘difference’, the 
dilemmas of ‘identity’ in democratic politics, and the question ‘does 
democracy need foundations’ get a sophisticated airing. The lines of 
mutual interaction between these different issues within the volume are 
complex - too much so to be explored at any length here. Gutmann 
(again) argues that deliberation provides the best justification for demo- 
cracy, and that disputes about ‘foundations’ are an unnecessary distrac- 
tion beyond that. Iris Marion Young’s advocacy of ‘communicative 
democracy’ - the most radical version of the deliberative model 
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discussed in the volume - is in large part based on the extent to which it 
can allow difference and the politics of identity its fullest expression. 
A persistent theme linking most contributions is the mixed legacy of 
universalist, individualistic liberalism for a modern democracy that must 
somehow accommodate assertions of particularistic identity and differ- 
ence without discarding safeguards of basic rights and standards of 
justice. In this vein, for example, Anne Phillips lucidly sets out the demo- 
cratic promise of the ‘politics of presence’, where one’s interests can only 
be represented adequately by someone drawn from one’s primary sub- 
group within a society, while recognizing the dangers of ‘essentializing’ 
group identities by formalizing the representation of particular identities; 
Kymlicka describes Canada’s efforts to institutionalize multi-nation, 
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural politics; and Carol Could defends her 
preferred conception of universally applicable standards of equality and 
liberty against efforts to move too far in accommodating difference. 
Otherwise especially noteworthy contributions, are convincing reminders 
from Fred Dallmayr and Carlos A. Forment, of why multiculturalism and 
hybrid identities are so important for democrats to deal with; Bonnie 
Honig’s playfully insightful turning inside-out of Bernard Williams’s 
noted illustrations of utilitarian reasoning; and succinct interventions into 
the ‘foundations’ debate by Richard Rorty and Robert A. Dahl. 
To this reviewer’s mind, though, the real highlight of Democracy and 
DiJfmence is the editor’s own account of the deliberative model, ‘Towards 
a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’. Benhabib’s contribu- 
tion, alongside others on deliberation from Jurgen Habermas, Joshua 
Cohen and Iris Marion Young is, however, best addressed by opening out 
the discussion. Accordingly, I turn to key themes in each of the three 
books dealing with a) the status and siting of deliberative democracy, and 
b) conflicting views on the interplay of deliberation and difference. 
Benhabib’s chapter in her volume clarifies and defends the deliberative 
model of democracy. Her version shares key features with that of Gutmann 
and Thompson. Given irreducible pluralism, the best we can do is to hold 
to a proceduralist conception of democracy. But, faced with citizens who 
may be ill-informed, unsure of their preferences and whose thinking is often 
based on narrow horizons, the outcomes from straightforward majoritarian 
liberal democratic procedures may lack a larger rationality. Deliberation is 
vital to rationality, broadening the horizons and reasoning of participants 
and ultimately encouraging the adoption of a more ‘impartial standpoint’ 
on issues. Likewise, the legitimacy of outcomes can be a function of how 
much (of the appropriate kind of) deliberation went into its making: 
‘legitimacy in complex democratic societies must be thought to result from 
the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of 
common concern’ (p. 68). The themes of rationality, impartiality and 
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legitimacy find echoes in the chapters by Joshua Cohen and Habermas, as 
well as in Gutmann and Thompson. 
Like Gutmann and Thompson, Benhabib offers an attractive vision, 
elucidating a key ingredient of ideal democratic practice. However, there 
is something of a sleight of hand involved. Benhabib and other contributors 
start with ‘the deliberative model of democracy’. Naming it in this way 
immediately brackets off liberal, individualistic and majoritarian ways of 
thinking about democracy. It does so in a way that implies that the 
deliberative model is self-sufficient - that deliberation of a certain sort 
could indeed be the major ingredient in an ideal but fully functioning and 
practical democratic system. Whatever the merits of the specific features 
of the deliberative models they advocate, writers like Benhabib and Cohen 
tend to underrate considerably the basic fact that majority votes must 
decide democratic outcomes where, even after deliberation, views conflict. 
More broadly, they do not appear to take sufficiently on board the fact that 
the modern state is, inevitably, structurally hierarchical, secretive, and 
unequal in the resources it grants to participants in and against its 
processes. In short, while deliberation may well be an ideal part of 
democratic processes, it can only be a part; it cannot be seen as the totality 
of a democratic decision-making process, nor can it be appropriately 
practised in any and all key institutions in a democratic system (note here 
Jane Mansbridge’s timely reminder of the inevitability of coercion in the 
practice of democracy, in Democracy and Difference). In short, this is not 
properly a ‘model of democracy’, but rates as a desirable ingredient within a 
larger theory of democracy; an element within a larger, more complex 
system of democratic structures rather than a self-contained substitute for 
some other, inherently separate model of democracy. To illustrate this 
point, I invite readers to examine Robert A. Dahl’s Democracy and Its Critics4 
- a work readily dismissed as proceduralist and majoritarian by some 
deliberationists - for an inventory of issues critical to a full theory of 
democracy that works by Gutmann and Thompson, Benhabib, Cohen, 
Habermas and others, with their narrower focus, leave out. 
The question of where deliberative forums might be fostered within the 
architecture of democratic systems dovetails with the above point. Earlier 
influential accounts of deliberative democracy were notable for starting 
with grand critiques of merely ‘plebiscitary’ or ‘aggregative’ conceptions 
of democracy, and then lowering the expectations of readers by recom- 
mending limited deliberative forums - as part of US presidential nomina- 
tion procedures or within political par tie^.^ The works under review 
* R. A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989. 
See J. S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1991, and J. Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, in A. Hamlin and P. 
Pettit (eds), The Good Polity, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989. 
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broaden the range of possible forums, but do little more than these 
earlier efforts to reconcile themselves to the inevitably non-deliberative 
features of real democratic sys tems. Broadly speaking, they recommend 
enhancing old and fostering new deliberative forums both in the state and 
outside it in civil society, and in formal and informal settings. Joshua 
Cohen writes of the role of associations, and Benhabib (following Nancy 
Fraser) of ‘subaltern counterpublics’ and ‘protected enclaves’ of 
oppositional societal deliberation. Gutmann and Thompson argue that 
deliberation would not be confined to the elite few, or any particular 
locations within political systems; it ought to be ‘part of the fabric of 
political life throughout government and in public life generally’ (p. 7). 
Both Habermas and Benhabib note the centrality of parliament and its 
traditions of debate. This constitutes an impressive menu of possibilities; 
I would contend none the less that further enlightenment on the issue of 
the appropriate siting of deliberation awaits the blending of aggregative, 
statist understandings of democracy and the insights of the deliberative 
‘model’ within a larger realist theory of democracy that takes inevitable 
trade-offs and dilutions of democratic practice fully on board. And this, 
as I suggest, should start with something like Dahl’s seminal text rather 
than the avowed deliberationists, primarily due to the real tensions in the 
work of the latter between their criticism of democracy as it is and the 
implicit reliance of their preferred ‘model’ on a wide array of existing, 
non-ideal institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
So, arguably at least, statism, the inevitability of aggregation, 
representation, coercion and the demands of time are all much more 
germane to the status and siting of deliberation than advocates suggest. 
Finally, when it comes to deliberation’s capacity to capture procedural 
needs arising from the assertion of identity and the politics of difference, 
things are also less clear-cut than the more sanguine analyses would have 
it. Against the institutionalization and celebration of group difference 
through deliberative procedures which aim towards the common good, 
inclusiveness and more fine-grained representation of interests in 
chapters by Cohen, Young, Phillips and others in Democracy and Differerne, 
March and Olsen offer salutary reminders of the opposite view. Without 
‘a framework of shared values and substantial agreement about what is 
morally acceptable and cognitively plausible’, they write, ‘talk is likely to 
accentuate differences rather than reduce them, escalate conflict rather 
than de-escalate it’ (pp. 62-3). Conflicts arising from (among other 
things) clashing identities might be better managed by concealing them 
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through ‘restricting each to particular times and places using different 
logics and principles’ (p. 79), and dealing with contentious issues sequent- 
ially rather than concurrently. Similarly, a certain ‘hypocrisy’ may be func- 
tional for democracy: ‘Democratic procedures of discourse seek 
systematically to subordinate authenticity in the expression of personal 
feelings, intentions, and motives to a ritualized politeness that mimics a 
community of shared commitments, values and affection’ (p. 85). 
However, just as the deliberationists may be overstating the status and 
potential for deliberative forums, so March and Olsen may be too 
functionalist in their approach to appreciate fully the need for radical new 
thinking about democratic institutions. 
These brief comments only scratch the surface of what these books 
have to offer, and of the questions they raise. Each has a great deal to 
commend it, and ought to be read by all whose concerns lie within or 
across the master question: how can, and how should, democracy be 
institutionalized and practised? 
